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THE GREATEST INTEREST RULE
Conflict of Laws-Choice-of-Laws: The Greatest Interest Rule
The vacillating and often conflicting theories regarding choice-of-law1
that have developed since Babcock v. Jackson2 were reconsidered in the
recent New York case of Miller v. Miller.3 In Miller, by a four to three
decision, the New York Court of Appeals expanded its earlier Babcock
ruling and adopted a "greatest interest rule" for its choice-of-law con-
flicts rule. By its new rule the court sought to avoid the anomalies that
can occur by adherence to one particular theory or by an ad hoc deter-
mination of particular cases.
Mr. Earl Miller, a New York resident, was on a business trip in
Maine, where he and his brother had mutual business interests. While
a passenger in a car driven by his brother and owned by his sister-in-law,
Mr. Miller was killed when the vehicle struck a bridge located in Maine.
The automobile trip began and was to end in Maine. Later, decedent's
brother and sister-in-law, who were Maine residents at the time of the
accident, moved to New York state. Thereafter, the decedent's wife
commenced in New York a wrongful death action against his brother and
sister-in-law. As a partial defense, the defendants asserted the Maine
statute that limits wrongful death recoveries to 20,000 dollars, which had
been in effect in Maine at the time of the accident, but which had since
'When a true conflict exists, commentators have offered different approaches:
(a) The forum's law should always be applied to effectuate forum policy, even
though the policy of another jurisdiction would thereby be defeated. ]3. CURUE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 181-87 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SELECTED ESSAYS]; Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Develop-
went in Conflicts of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212, 1242-43 (1963) (this collec-
tion of comments by several authors on Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), will be hereinafter cited as Comments
ont Babcock v. Jackson, with a parenthetical indication of the appropriate author).
(b) The forum should weigh the interests and apply the dominant one. Reese,
Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 688
(1963). (c) The law of the state with the most significant relationship should
control. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1964). (d) Apply the forum's law except when variations are necessary to
accommodate the interests of the parties. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 101-20 (1962); Comments on Babcock v. Jackson (Ehrenzweig) 1246. (e)
Courts should work out rules of preference, applying the "lower standard of con-
duct or of a financial protection" in the absence of a pre-existing relationship
between the parties. D. CAERs, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCEss 114 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as TEE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS]; Cavers, The Two "Local-Law"
Theories, 63 HARv. L. REv. 822 (1950); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Con-
flicts Problems, 21 U. PITT. L. REv. 573, 580 (1960).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
222 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
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been repealed. 4 On a motion to dismiss the partial defense, the trial court
allowed the motion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, choosing
New York law, which allowed full and unlimited recovery for a wrong-
ful death action.
In reaching its decision, the court traced the development of its pres-
ent choice-of-law rule. At the outset it conceded that "candor requires
the admission that our past decisions have lacked a precise consis-
tency .... -" The first case considered by the Miller court in its chro-
nological chart was Babcock, a 1963 decision.' In Babcock, the court
refused to apply an Ontario guest statute barring recovery because all
the parties involved were New York residents; the car was garaged, li-
censed, and insured in New York; the trip began and was to end in New
York; and Ontario was merely the place of the accident. The rule of
Babcock was that "[j]ustice, fairness, and 'the best practical result' ...
may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the juris-
diction, which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence
or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the
litigation."' The Babcock rule, denominated under such various head-
ings as "grouping of contacts" and "center of gravity,",, had its origin
in earlier New York tort cases.9 In a 1954 contracts case the emphasis
was put upon the law of the place "which has the most significant con-
tacts with the matter in dispute."" Babcock unequivocally rejected the
traditional choice-of-law rule, lex loci delicti, which looked invariably to
the substantive law of the place of the tort. The traditional rule "ignores
the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred
may have in the resolution of particular issues."" It could be contended
that Babcock discarded the rigid and mechanical lex loci rule and re-
placed it with another mechanical rule, i.e., a mere quantitative grouping
'No Maine decisions deal with the retroactivity of the amendment, but the
prevailing rule is that such amendments are substantive in nature, and, without
clear contrary legislation or legislative intent, are not applied retroactively. See
generally Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1105 (1964).
522 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
'Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
7Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
8Id.
° See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), re-
viewed in Currie, Conflict, Crises and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1,
noted in Note, 111 U. PA. L. Rnv. 371 (1963); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), noted in Note, Selection
of Law Governing Measure of Damages for Wrongful Death, 61 CoLum. L. REv.
1497 (1961).
'0 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954).12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1963).
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of contacts whereby the court adds the contacts of -the two states and the
state with the greatest number of contacts has its law applied. However,
in it re Estate of CrichtonP2 and In re Estate of Clark, 3 the court re-
jected such an approach and stated that "[c]ontacts obtain significance
only to the extent that they relate to the policies and purposes sought to
be vindicated by the conflicting laws."' 4 Thus, the Miller case gave the
court an opportunity to explain further and demonstrate its rule as it has
evolved. The court set forth its new choice-of-law rule as follows:
[T]he rule which has evolved clearly in our most recent decisions is
that the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the liti-
gation will be applied and the facts or contacts which obtain signif-
icance in defining State interests are those which relate to the pur-
pose of the particular law in conflict.15
This doctrine might be denominated the "greatest interest rule."
After defining its new rule, the court demonstrated its application.
New York, by its Constitution, not only permits full recovery for wrong-
ful death, but also prohibits any legislative act providing otherwise. 6
Thus, New York is vitally concerned with compensating the economic
losses of a decedent's family, probably to protect its citizens from becom-
ing wards of the state. Although this substantial New York interest per
se might have allowed the courts to apply its law, 17 the new rule required
a look into more general considerations, which should concern "a justice-
dispensing court in a modern American State.""'
These countervailing considerations include fairness to the nominal
and real party defendant, expectations of the parties, possible interference
1220 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
1821 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
1,20 N.Y.2d at 135 n.8, 228 N.E.2d at 806 n.8, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820 n.8; 21
N.Y.2d at 485-86, 236 N.E.2d at 156, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
15 22 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 736. See Reich v. Pur-
cell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967) ; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416
Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408
(1965); Comnents on Babcock v. Jackson (Currie) 1235; Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 657 (1959).
"o N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18.
17 SELECTED EssAYs 181-87; Comments on Babcock v. Jackson (Currie) 1242-
43. In the case of an unavoidable conflict between the legitimate interests of two
sister states, Professor Currie would have the court apply the law of the forum.
Many writers have commented on the Currie approach. See Hill, Governmental
Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L.
REv. 463 (1960); Traynor, Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum,
49 CALIF. L. REv. 845 (1961); Whitman, Conflict of Spousal Immunity Laws:
The Legislature Takes A Hand, 46 N.C.L. REv. 506 (1968).
' Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 267, 295 (1966).
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with a legitimate interest of a sister state, and the prevention of forum
shopping. First, it would be unfair for the forum to apply its law to a
party patterning his conduct upon another state's statute; however, in
Miller the Maine statute limiting a wrongful death recovery is remedial
in nature, obviously, and not a statute upon which a person would rely
in governing his conduct. Second, the liability insurer, the real party in
interest, might be harmed by the application of New York law. The court
found through an analysis of the actuarial process and information gath-
ered from the Insurance Commission of Maine that the presence of the
20,000 dollars limitation had no substantial effect on insurance rates, and
that refusing to apply Maine law would have little, if any, effect on the
insurance premiums in Maine. Third, as to the expectations of the
parties, the court considered it an obvious fiction that parties rely on
certain statutes and expect their application in a lawsuit.2"
Though our nation is divided into fifty-one separate legal systems,
our people act most of the time as if they live in a single one. They




There are few speculations more difficult than assessment of the expec-
tations of parties as to the laws applicable to their activities, and this is
especially true when the expectations relate to the law of torts.22 Fourth,
Maine by its statutory limitation, showed a desire to protect its residents
in wrongful death actions. The fact that the defendants in Miller were
no longer Maine residents meant to the court that to apply New York
law would not unduly interfere with a legitimate interest of Maine in
regulating the rights of its citizens, since no judgment would be entered
against a Maine resident. Finally, a court might ignore a change in
domicile to prevent forum shopping, but apparently the court found that
the defendants' move to New York was not made to achieve a more fa-
vorable legal climate. The Miller court compiled these various contacts re-
lating them to the countervailing interests and expectations of the parties
and of the two states. This approach is vastly different from a mere
numerical or quantitative grouping of contacts and from the mechanical
application of the law of the place of the tort.
1- 22 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 740. See Morris, En-
terprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70
YALE L.J. 554, 560-81 (1961).
20 22 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 883, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
"Tra CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 119.
22 Id. at 302. See also Traynor, Conflict of Laws in Time, 1967 DuxE L.J. 713,
715.
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Due to the myriad of writers and rules in the choice-of-law area, the
"greatest interest rule," as defined in Miller, may still be misunderstood.
Such potential misunderstanding is aptly demonstrated in the dissenting
opinions in Miller. Two dissenters would have applied Maine law under
either the "significant contacts rule" of Babcock, the principle of prefer-
ence, or the newly emerging "greatest interest rule." The significant
contacts in Miller would be that Maine was the place of the accident; the
car was licensed and garaged in Maine; the trip was wholly in Maine;
the trip was connected with Maine business; and, decedent's stay in Maine
was not transient but was one of several recurring sojourns in connec-
tion with a business in Maine. Thus, Maine law would be applied under
the Babcock doctrine since Maine had the most significant contacts.23
As to Professor Caver's approach to a principle of preference,24 both
Maine and New York have an interest in applying their rules regarding
damages, and therefore a true conflict exists. Under this analysis, the
"lower standard of conduct or of a financial protection" of the state where
defendant acted and the injury occurred should be applied in the absence
of a previously existing relationship between the parties.25 Lastly, these
dissenters felt the majority had applied the interest analysis too rigidly
and had given too much weight to the domicile of the parties seeking re-
covery. The dominant consideration in adjudication of multistate trans-
actions is the "reasonable expectations of persons participating in transac-
tions," 20 since this lends justice to the determination. The majority, as
previously mentioned, rejected the reasonable expectation argument as
being based upon an obvious fiction that it is possible in tort cases to
assess the parties' expectations of what law governs their actions.
In their consideration of the greatest interest rule, the dissenters
thought the majority had adopted Professor Currie's approach of gov-
ernmental interest analysis, which leads to the conclusion that a party
carries most of the defenses and rights of his domiciliary law about with
him." States then must apply their law to protect legitimate objects of
"3 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 749 (1963).
" THE C OiCE-OF-LAw PROCESS 114-138; Cavers, The Two "Local Law"
Theories, 63 HARV. L. REv. 822 (1950); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law
Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
" See THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 114; note 1(e) sapra.
2022 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 886, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 747. See Rheinstein,
Book Review, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 369 (1965).
122 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 885, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 746. For Professor
Currie's analysis of the governmental interest approach, see SELECTED ESSAYS
183-84.
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their legislative concern.28 Professor Currie would have the court in-
quire into the policies of the respective conflicting laws and then "inquire
into the circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states
to assert an interest in the application of those policies." 29 Yet, after the
above construction and interpretation, if there is still a "conflict between
the legitimate interests of the two states, . . . [Currie would] apply the
law of the forum."" Certainly, the majority adopted aspects of several
approaches, and in applying the rule illustrated the duty of a court to
compare all countervailing considerations. The New York "greatest in-
terest rule" then is more flexible than Professor Currie's approach, while
containing similar features. The rule adequately analyzes the forum's
relationship to .the case in terms of possible forum interests and adds a
flavor of individualized justice in its countervailing considerations.
North Carolina has not entered the battleground of the conflicting
choice-of-law rules, choosing instead to retain the traditional lex loci
delicti rule.31 The reason for not abandoning lex loci is probably based
upon a desire for stability and predictibility through stare decisis, and a
desire that the legislature make any change in the present conflicts rule.
In 1967, the North Carolina General Assembly did modify the state's
traditional rule as it applies to spousal immunity. 2 It is evident that the
North Carolina courts will not venture into what it has termed a "voy-
28See SELECTED ESSAYS 183-84; Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication
Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205, 221-22 (1958).
2 Comments on Babcock v. Jackson (Currie) 1242.
2oId. at 1242-43.
"1 The reports are filled with cases that praise and follow lex loci. See, e.g.,
Hutchins v. Day, 269 N.C. 607, 153 S.E.2d 132 (1967); Petrea v. Ryder, 264
N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); Doss v. Seawell, 257 N.C. 404, 125 S.E.2d 899
(1962); Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C. 260, 34 S.E.2d 185 (1945). See Wurfel,
Conflict of Laws, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 923 (1966).
This traditional, mechanical choice of law rule of lex loci delicti, embodied in the
first RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 383 (1934), is that the substantive
rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by the
law of the place of the tort. It has as its conceptual foundation the vested rights
doctrine, namely, that a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the
jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for its existence and extent
solely on such law. Professor Beale explained that "[i]t is impossible for a
plaintiff to recover in tort unless he has been given by some law a cause of action
in tort; and this cause of action can be given only by the law of the place where
the tort was committed. That is the place where the injurious event occurs, and
its law is the law therefore which applies to it." 2 J. BEALE, CONFLICT oF LAWS §
378.1 (1935).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5.1 (Supp. 1967). This statute and its implications
upon existing choice-of-law doctrines has been discussed by Professor Whitman.
He considers the Currie governmental interest analysis in depth and concludes
that the legislature should further consider the choice-of-law problem on a case-by-
case, fact-by-fact basis. See Whitman, supra note 17, at 519.
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age into ... an uncharted sea,"33 preferring the comfortable predictibility
of stare decisis to individualized justice. In this still inchoate area of
law, however, a case-by-case development of rules without rigid adherence
to any one theory is necessary in order to establish sound principles.
"The objective is to achieve justice in a particular case and cases of like
kind, avoiding ideology, on the one hand, and particularistic result-ori-
ented determinations, on the other." 4 This rational approach would
end ad hoc decisions. If a court, choosing between particular state laws,
can identify the policies embodied in those laws and determine if a true
conflict exists,35 then it should use the facts or contacts to determine
which state has a better claim, giving weight to the parties' expectations
and other countervailing considerations. A few wide-sweeping rules
could thus be avoided. This process would give hope that decisions
founded upon discriminating assessments of policies and expectations
will slowly build up a body of differentiated rules to which courts can
adhere, bringing predictibility back into play. North Carolina for the
present is content with lex loci. Perhaps a rule so well defined as the
'(greatest interest rule' will cause the court to reassess its status quo
position and perceive the possible individualized justice for each case and
a possible predictibility therein.
ERIC Miuzs HOLMES
Constitutional Law-Reapportionment-One Man, One Vote
Applied to Local Governing Bodies
The one man, one vote rule of the United States Supreme Court has.
been described as "the symbol of an aspiration for fairness, for avoidance
of complexity and for intelligibility in our representational processes in
our mass democracy." 1 By Avery v. Midland County,2 the Court has
expanded the equal representation concept of Reynolds v. Sims3 and its
" Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 616, 129 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1963).
122 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 890, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 752. See also THE:
CHOIcE-OF-LAw PROCESS 121-23.
"See geterally, Traynor, supra note 15; Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF.
L. REv. 74 (1967).
'Dixon, Reapportionment Perspectives: What Is Fair Representation?, 5I
A.B.A.J. 319, 324 (1965).390 U.S. 474 (1968).
'377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Court said:
[W]e conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity
for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.
